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Abstract 
The starting point in this paper is based on the strand of the 
literature on corporatist systems stressing the role of co-operation 
and consensus   in wage bargaining in order to reach better 
economic performances. In order to model a co-operative regime 
in the classical framework in which the monopoly union controls 
wages and the firm controls employment, we introduce social 
preferences with some degree of other-regarding concern(ORC) 
such that each agent's objective function is a linear combination of 
her own welfare and the other's. The results show that under 
specific conditions concerning the degree of ORC, one may obtain 
an employment level higher  than in the selfish case  and  wage 
moderation. 
Keywords: wage bargaining, corporatism,  cooperation,  social 
preferences. 
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1. Introduction
? 
Since the seminal paper by Calmfors and Driffil (1988), there has 
been an ongoing debate  focusing on the impact of industrial-
relations organisational form on labour market performance mainly 
in terms of wage, inflation and unemployment. The well-known 
distinction characterising industrial relations is decentralisation 
versus a centralised bargaining setting as the extreme 
organisational solutions. In this context the distinguishing 
institutional features of neocorporatism have initially been identified 
as centralised monopolistic union federations and employer 
associations underpinning centralised collective bargaining 
(Schmitter, 1981). The development of the debate has led to 
considering neocorporatism as characterised by a high level of co-
ordination. Co-ordination is meant as a broader institutional 
characteristic which  encompasses not only formal bargaining 
centralisation but also state-imposed centralisation, informal 
centralisation or the pattern-setting of a powerful economic sector 
(Kenworthy, 2001). The outgrowth of the emphasis on co-
ordination has been the shift of attention on to the importance of 
consensus and co-operation in fostering co-ordination. In particular, 
the role played by inter partes and intra partes co-ordination - within 
unions and firm organisations- along with consensus in the 
decision making process of wage bargaining has drawn some 
interest (Soskice, 1990; Hartog e Teulings, 1998; Nickell, 1997). 
Moreover, Pohjola when pointing to some key-aspects of 
neocorporatism, has defined  it as 'one in which the interest 
organisations either share a vision of economic policy similar to 
that of government or, through interest intermediation, reach 
outcomes which are essentially similar to the ones obtainable 
under  the sharing of objectives' (Pohjola, 1992:  58,  emphasis 
added). What seems to follow is that an important role in 
macroeconomic performance is not only played by the bargaining 
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structure but also by the degree of co-operation and consensus 
among the relevant groupings (Pohjola, idem). 
Thus, the evolution of the debate has contributed to a further 
development of the definition of a neocorporatist system, which has 
freed it from the link with the centralisation of the bargaining 
structure. This implies that when one addresses the issue of which 
bargaining systems attains a better macroeconomic performance, 
the organisational solution along with the presence of co-operation 
and consensus among the main stakeholders (unions, firms and 
government) in the bargaining process,  have to be taken into 
consideration. C o-operation  and consensus can, in fact, be 
enhanced by the sharing of objectives, which may ultimately lead to 
co-ordination. In this respect Pohjola (idem) again provides a useful 
insight by considering nominal wage control as a public good, 
whose contribution costs are borne by workers (and their 
organisations) and whose benefits represent a socially desirable 
solution in terms of higher employment and lower inflation. As such 
the benefits may meet government macroeconomic goals and 
enhance collective welfare. The crucial aspect is that workers' 
incentives to bear the costs are represented, for instance, by 
unemployment benefits, training programs and other types of 
guarantees supplied by the government. Thus, from this 
perspective the sharing of objectives mainly concerns 
workers/unions and government. This can partly explain the 
interest of a strand of the literature in modelling co-operation 
between  the union and the government on inflation and 
unemployment (Gylfason, Lindbeck, 1994; Acocella, Ciccarone, 
1997; Burda, 1997). More recently Acocella and Di Bartolomeo 
(2001) have modelled a co-operative regime by considering an 
objective function given by the linear combination of the objective 
function of a monopoly union and the government. Both are 
assumed to take care of price stability and employment, whereas 
the union is also interested in real wage.  
From this perspective, in the paper it is believed crucial to shift 
the focus of attention  from the organisational features on  to the 
agents’ motivational aspects and to consider the bargaining sides 
as  endowed  with social preferences embodying such  sharing of 
objectives. Social preferences, in fact, refer to an agent who “not   9 
only cares about the material resources allocated to her but also 
cares about the material resources allocated to relevant reference 
agents” (Fehr, Fischbacher, 2002: C2). Generally, in the literature 
the type of social preferences considered are the ones believed to 
best represent  reciprocal  fairness or conditional cooperative 
attitude  such  as inequity aversion, envious preferences and pure 
altruism/unconditional cooperative attitude (Fehr, Fischbacher, 
idem). In this frame of analysis, it seems appropriate to introduce a 
type of social preferences characterising agents’ positive concern 
for collective welfare, meant as positively valuing not only the single 
agent’s own objective but also the ones of the other members of 
the  reference group. This motivation can be underpinned by the 
values or rules shared by the social setting in which the agents are 
embedded; these  rules can help raise the awareness of social 
interests and  of  collective goals (Alkire, Deneulin, 2000). In this 
specific context, the rules underlying collective preference may be 
based, for instance, on the awareness that in a long-run 
perspective high inflation rate may negatively affect investment and 
growth (Leigh-Pemberton, 1992), which may be detrimental for 
employment (Marsden, 1995). This type of argument leads to the 
more general consideration that such preferences can be shaped 
by the knowledge shared by labour market parties that as Marsden 
(idem) argues, the tight connection between their own interests is 
such that conflicts may inflict heavy costs on both sides.  
An example of collective-welfare-oriented preferences can be 
traced back to the Swedish case in the post war period until the 
mid seventies, when both the employers and union representatives 
kept their freedom from government intervention by guaranteeing 
wage moderation  in order to preserve the economy 
competitiveness, and employment. Thus the government delegated 
the r esponsibility for income policy to labour market parties in 
exchange for macroeconomic balance (Nilsson, 1993). 
The type of collective-goal-oriented preferences considered in this 
paper is taken as one of the ways of introducing a co-operation-
and-consensus-based behaviour  deriving from the sharing of 
common goals. In major details, our main concern is to analyse the 
effects of social preferences on the bargaining outcomes in terms 
of wage  and employment by considering firms and union as the   10 
relevant groupings in the bargaining process. It is important to 
specify that  social preferences are characterised by  the 
internalisation of the opponents' welfare in each agent's objective 
function according to some degree of other-regarding concern 
(ORC).  In the following sections the model will be explained in 
details (§2), in §3 the main implications of considering the other 
regarding behaviour with respect to the selfish one will be shown. It 
will be also analysed  in §4 whether  the presence of social 
preferences can  lead to some welfare improvement. Finally 
conclusions will be drawn. 
2. The model 
We consider bargaining in the classical framework in which the 
monopoly union (monopoly seller of labour to the firm) controls 
wages and the firm controls employment. We shape the agents' 
objective functions in such a way as to include what we have 
previously called other-regarding concern (ORC). In order to model 
this type of ORC preferences, we consider each agent's objective 
function as a linear combination of her own welfare and the other's. 
This means that individual welfare is affected to a certain extent, 
depending on the parameter of the linear combination, also by the 
opponent's welfare. As will become clear later, the objective 
functions embodying ORC concerns, can be taken as a more 
general form of the standard ones depending on the value of the 
parameters of the linear combination. 
The motivation functions are Vf for the firm and Vu for the union and 
are expressed as follows:   11 
 
Vf =(1-bf) ?  + bf U
                              
  (1) 
Vu=(1-bu )U + bu  ?                             
  (2) 
where        ? = p(y(n))y(n) –wn  
            with  y=f(n) , f’>0, f’’<0, p’<0, 
U=[wn + (m-n)s] 
m = union membership 
s = alternative wage or unemployment subsidy 
1/2>bf?0, 1/2> bu?0 
 
?   and  U  are respectively the standard profit  function for a 
monopolistic firm and the standard  utility function for the union. 
The degrees of the union's and the firm's ORC, bu and bf, indicate 
that either agent weighs the self-seeking payoff and the other's 
payoff in her motivation function. They s um up to one, which 
underlines that an increase in the weight of the opponent's payoff 
implies a reduction in the weight of one's own payoff. Accordingly 
the presence of ORC implies some reduction in the importance of 
self-seeking interests. Moreover, the restrictions on the parameters 
imply that each agent ever considers her own payoff more than the 
other one's.  
In the model it is assumed complete and perfect information and 
the timing of the strategic interaction is the following: 1) the union 
makes wage demand; 2) the firms observes and chooses 
employment; 3) the final payoffs will be  Vf *(w*(bu,bf),n*(bu,bf)); 
Vu*(w*(bu,bf),n*(bu,bf)). 
2.1 Solving backward: the firm's reaction function  
In stage (2), the firm maximises the objective function for any 
arbitrary wage demand set by the union and her reaction function 
is: 
































The firm’s reaction function shows that as the firm internalises the 
union's objective according to her degree of ORC, cares not only 
about her profit but also about workers. This implies that  
a) labour demand rises when the alternative wage decreases. 
b) labour demand rises when firm’s ORC rises as one can see 
from the derivative with respect to bf: 
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Thus, the greater bf, the greater labour demand as the firm, taking 
into account union welfare, when setting employment is more 
willing to increase employment to let union welfare grow as well. 
In absence of ORC, for bf=0, (3) becomes the standard solution for 








The above  equation corresponds to the standard solution for a 
monopolist firm. Moreover, The firm's reaction function with 
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According to (4), the marginal benefit from behaving as a selfish 
monopolist has to be greater than the marginal benefit from 
unemployment. This implies that the relativist labour demand is 
above the individualist one when employment is lower than the level 
corresponding to the alternative wage, s.  
As one can see from (5) below, the elasticity of labour demand is a 
function of the elasticity of the labour demand in the standard 
monopolist case, and a function of the firm's ORC. 
 
In (5), MR(n) stands for the marginal revenue in the standard case 
(without ORC). 
2.2 The union maximisation problem and the equilibrium solutions 
The union chooses the wage maximising the objective function 
subject to the firm labour demand and from the first order 
conditions one obtains the equilibrium union wage demand. The 
existence of an intersection point between the latter and the firm's 
reaction functions allows individuating the equilibrium wage (see 
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Given the above results from the strategic interaction between the 
firm and the union, (wORC*, nORC*(wORC*), the comparative statics 
analysis gives the following results (see the Appendix for details): 
 
 




     
 
 
The first couple of derivatives shows that the union (the leader) 
when setting the wage, knows that the firm weighs more the 
importance given to workers and decides to exploit the firm’s higher 
ORC by choosing a higher wage. This means that as the union 
internalises the firm’s objective, raises wage until the weighed 
marginal benefit for employed is equal to the weighed marginal cost 
for unemployed (lower employment) and to the marginal cost for 
the firm (lower profit).  
) 7 (
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The second couple of derivatives shows that the union when 
setting the wage, weighs more the firm’s profit and sets a lower 
wage with a corresponding higher employment. 
3. How do the equilibrium employment and wage from other-
regarding preferences (wORC*, n ORC*) behave in comparison 
with the ones from selfish preferences (wM*, nM*)?  
In this section, the equilibrium solutions respectively corresponding 
to the standard case and to the ORC preferences w ill be 
compared. The ORC employment level is always greater than the 
selfish one (i.e. py’(nORC*(wORC*))<py’(nM*(wM*))) whereas they are 
equal when bu=0 for any bf (< ½). As to wage, the inequality below 







It yields a clear-cut result in two cases: the ORC degrees are the 
same (first case below); one agent is selfish and the other has 
some other- regarding concern (third case). When  the ORC 
degrees are different but both positive, it is crucial the elasticity 
value and we focus our attention on the situation where this 
inequality surely holds. For any value of the monopolist labour 
demand elasticity, the above inequality holds if the whole 
expression on the left-hand side is ?0 (second case). 
Given the previous consideration, three cases will be considered in 
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First  case: the agents have the same degree of other regarding 
concern (bu=bf) 
When the parameters are equal, it is always the case that the 
employment level with ORC is greater: nORC*(w*)>nM*(w*). As to 





and wORC* ?wM*  in the opposite case. 
The left hand side of (10) can be taken as the relative degree of 
ORC, and the right hand side as an indicator of agents' market 
considerations driven by labour demand elasticity, which affects 
the union bargaining power and the mark-up on non labour income. 
If for both the degrees of concern with the other welfare prevails 
over economic considerations,  the ORC equilibrium wage is 
greater than the selfish one. With a low value of labour demand 
elasticity and an effective union bargaining power, it is necessary a 
higher ORC degree to achieve wage moderation with respect to 
the situation characterised by a high elasticity. In the latter case the 
constraint of market conditions, characterised, for instance, by a 
high product demand elasticity, limits the possibility of transferring 
a wage increase on price and weakens the union power. Thus, one 
needs a lower value of b to obtain wage restraint.  
Second case: The agents have a different degree of other-
regarding concern (bu?bf) 
As well as in the previous case, the employment level with ORC is 
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As one can notice in (11), when there is a different degree of ORC, 
market driven considerations do not enter the choice of the union 
when setting the wage. In this context, for wage restraint the ratio of 
the union's ORC to the firm's one has to be greater than 1. Thus, if 
the union cares more about the other than the firm does there will 
be always wage moderation with respect to the case with selfish 
behaviour, for any value of the elasticity.  Accordingly the size of bu 
with respect to bf is crucial for wage moderation. 
Third case: The  responsibility for wage moderation and higher 
employment   
An interesting case to analyse concerns which of the two 
bargaining sides it is better take on the responsibility for wage 
moderation and higher employment. In this respect, it is useful to 
consider the limit of the left hand side of (9) for  bf? 0 e  ?  
bu? ?0,1/2?, which is equal to + ? . This implies that when there is a 
union with some positive ORC facing a firm rather scarcely 
interested in the opponent welfare, the outcome will be wage 
moderation. along with higher employment. One obtains an equal 
result when the limit of the left hand side of (9) is taken for bu? 1/2 
and ? bf? ?0,1/2? , which is equal to + ? . Thus, in these two cases it 
possible to achieve wage moderation and higher employment with: 
-  a highly concerned union facing a firm with a lower ORC; 
-  a union with some positive ORC interacting with a firm which 
tends to behave selfishly. 
On the contrary, inequality (9) holds and wORC>wM when bu=0 and 
?  bf? ?0,1/2? as the left hand side of (9) is equal to -2. Moreover, as 
specified above, the employment is such that nORC* = nM*. 
The same as to wage  (wORC>wM)  occurs if  bf  ? 1/2 and  ?  
bu? ?0,1/2?. According to the latter two cases, there is not any wage 
moderation in the two following situations when: 
-  a purely selfish union deals with a firm with some positive 
ORC; also the union fully exploits the monopoly power and the 
degree of firm's ORC, by setting a higher wage with a 
corresponding unemployment level not reduced.  
-  the union is characterised by some ORC though lower than the 
concern of the firm which tends to be fully interested in the   18 
union's welfare. In addition, the employment level will be higher 







The figure above depicts an entire set of  bu-and-bf  values 
entailing wage moderation, related to inequality (9). This set is 
located in the area above and along the curve, which represents 
the combinations of  bu  and  bf  annulling the l eft hand side 








This equality guarantees that wORC<wM and below the curve the 
equilibrium relativist wage may be either higher or lower than the 
selfish one, depending on the labour demand elasticity. Along the 
diagonal (first case with bu=bf) in order to have wage moderation, 
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Following the previous results it is possible to argue that wage 
moderation is easier to achieve when the union ORC is higher than 
the firm's. Moreover, when both agents have some positive ORC, 
this guarantees that employment is always higher than the level 
with selfish preferences. In the case of bargaining involving a 
selfish and an ORC type, when the union is selfish, there is not any 
wage moderation and employment is the same as in the standard 
model. In the opposite situation with a firm tending to act selfishly, 
one obtains wage moderation and higher employment.  
3.1 Social preferences and the targets of wage moderation and of 
unemployment 
Following the results analysed in the previous section, the 
subsequent step is to firstly identify  what the role of social 
preferences can be in order to achieve wage/price moderation and 
the reduction in unemployment according to the importance given 
by the bargaining sides to either target or both. Secondly it is also 
interesting to single out the  agent who  may take on the 
responsibility for the outcome in terms of wage and unemployment. 
If  there is a pressing need for controlling  inflation and labour 
demand elasticity constrains the possibility of the firms transferring 
wage increase on prices, there is little scope for role of social 
preferences as market conditions may  suffice for wage restraint.  
When wage and price restraint along with employment 
represent primary targets,  it would be preferable to have both 
bargaining sides  equally  concerned with collective welfare to the 
extent depending on market conditions. In details, in presence of an 
elastic labour demand, it can be argued that the goals can be met 
in the case of  the  bargaining  agents  being equally  moderately 
interested in the opponent's welfare. On the contrary, in the case of 
market conditions strengthening the union bargaining power, social 
preferences would require each side take into account the 
opponent's welfare in a significant way and to the same extent. In   20 
the latter case the union would not fully exploit the bargaining power 
and would not raise the wage as much as in the selfish case.  
If the main objective is only unemployment, this is possible with the 
union and the firm taking into account moderately and to the same 
degree the opponent's welfare. This leads to an employment level 
higher than in the standard case whereas the outcome in terms of 
wage will depend on the value of labour demand elasticity.  
If for some reasons we will not dwell upon in this paper,  it is 
necessary to choose the agent who has to take on the 
responsibility for both wage moderation and a higher employment, 
it is more effective the role played by the union. This clearly 
depends on this type of setting with the union behaving as the 
leader and controlling wages.  
4. A comparison with the efficient bargaining solution 
A further development of this analysis is to verify whether in this 
type of strategic interaction with the monopoly union behaving as 
leader and controlling wages and the firm setting the employment 
level, the  presence of some positive ORC degree in both 
bargaining sides allows for collective welfare improvement. Thus, it 
is interesting to compare the ORC results from the model above 
with the ones from efficient bargaining. The efficient bargaining 
solution is derived from our model setting bu and bf equal to zero 
and by maximising the union objective function ((2) above) subject 
to the constraint of a given level of firm's profit ((1) above). As the 
marginal utility of income is constant, the contract curve is vertical 
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According to (12), nEB is the optimal employment level for any value 
of wage.  It can be  compared with (7), the ORC equilibrium 







The ORC marginal revenue is always greater than the one in the 
case of efficient bargaining  as in (7bis) it can be shown that the 
ratio on the  right hand side of s is always greater than one for 
? bf<1/2 and  ? bu<1/2, and for  ?<-1 (see  the A ppendix). This 
implies that for any wage above s (given (4) above), nORC*<nEB*. 
Interestingly, efficient bargaining with ORC gives the same result 
as in (11).  The relevant aspect of this result is that  when the 
strategic interaction between the firm and the union does not allow 
for the union leadership, the presence of objective functions with 
ORC does not play any role in the efficient bargaining.   
Moreover, i n presence of ORC, the solutions coincide with the 
efficient bargaining one (i.e. in (7bis) the ratio at the right hand side 
of s is always equal to one if either bf = 1 or bu = 1/2. Which is 
never the case as the social preferences would be such that either 
the firm values only the union welfare or the union equally weighs 
her own welfare and the firm's.  
Following these considerations it is not mistaken to argue that 
when the bargaining sides are interested in both targets of wage 
restraint and higher employment, the presence of social 
preferences may induce some welfare improvement. This occurs if 
agents’ behaviour based on the ORC motivation, encompasses 
any couple of bu and bf allowing for wage moderation and higher 
employment with respect to the selfish case (examined in the 
previous section), though the level of employment is lower than the 
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Concluding Remarks 
Along with the organisational form of industrial relations, a crucial 
role can also be played by the motivational aspects underlying 
agents’ behaviour and their decision-making process. The type of 
motivation taken into account in the paper is related to social 
preferences and regards the extent to which the agents involved in 
the bargaining process internalise some concern with collective 
welfare (by taking into account the opponent' welfare). In our view, 
such preferences allow modelling the sharing of objectives, which, 
following Pohjola, is believed to be one of the main characteristics 
of neocorporatist systems as  it can  foster consensus and 
cooperation on overall macroeconomic goals. The internalisation of 
ORC in the  objective functions of the  bargaining sides has 
disclosed the possibility of achieving a  better macroeconomic 
performance in terms of wage moderation and employment, 
starting from the motivational assumption based on the awareness 
of the importance of collective goals, and considering the 
interaction of such social preferences with market conditions.    23 
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